Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

State of Utah v. Robert Harold Boaz : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald S Fujino; Richard G. Uday; Salt Lake Legal Defenders; Attorney for Appellant.
James H. Beadles; Charlene Barlow; Assistant Attorneys General; Jan Graham; Attorney General;
Attorney for Appellee .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Boaz, No. 940245 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5933

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

r.tt

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 9404K-CA

ROBERT HAROLD BOAZ,

Priority No. 2

"

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR FRAUDULENT OFFER OR^//
SALE OF SECURITIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 61-1-1 (1989); OFFER OR SALE OF UNREGISTERED
SECURITIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-7
(1989); OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES BY AN
UNREGISTERED AGENT, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE

ANN. § 61-1-3(1) (Supp. 1994), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, THE HON. TYRONE E. MEDLEY,
PRESIDING

JAMES H. BEADLES (5250)

RONALD S. FUJINO
RICHARD G. UDAY

Assistant Attorney General

Salt Lake Legal Defenders' Assoc.

CHARLENE BARLOW

424 East 500 South, Suite 300

Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)538-1021

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

V

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff. Appellee,

Case No. 940425-CA

ROBERT HAROLD BOAZ,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR FRAUDULENT OFFER OR

SALE OF SECURITIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 61-1-1 (1989); OFFER OR SALE OF UNREGISTERED
SECURITIES, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-7
(1989); OFFER OR SALE OF SECURITIES BY AN
UNREGISTERED AGENT, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE

ANN. § 61-1-3(1) (Supp. 1994), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, THE HON. TYRONE E. MEDLEY,
PRESIDING

RONALD S. FUJINO

JAMES H. BEADLES (5250)

RICHARD G. UDAY

Assistant Attorney General

Salt Lake Legal Defenders' Assoc.

CHARLENE BARLOW

424 East 500 South. Suite 300

Assistant Attorney General

Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111

JAN GRAHAM (1231)

236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)538-1021
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

3

ARGUMENT

POINT I

BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED FOR

VIOLATING A RULE OR ORDER, SECTION 61-1-21 DOES NOT
LIMIT THE COURT'S ABILITY TO SENTENCE HIM
TO PRISON

POINT II.

4

THE TRIAL COURT HAD PERSONAL AND SUBJECT-MATTER

JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT; THEREFORE. THE
COURT CORRECTLY DENTED HIS
MOTION TO DISMISS
CONCLUSION

7
9

ADDENDA

Addendum A

United States v. Lilley. 291 F. Supp.989 (D.C. Tex 1968)

Addendum B

State v. Stephan. 671 P.2d 780 (Wash.App. 1983)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED

Nielson v. Schiller. 66 P.2d 365 (Utah 1937)

8

State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978)

6

State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993)

1. 6

State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990)

6

State v. Stephan. 671 P.2d 780 (Wash. App. 1983)

5

United States v. Lillev. 291 F. Supp. 989 (D.C. Tex. 1968)

5, 6, 7

STATUTES

U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1

8

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (Supp. 1994)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1989) (R. 9.10.11)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1992)

3, 4. 5. 6, 7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1) (1995)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994)

1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 940425-CA

Priority No. 2

ROBERT HAROLD BOAZ,

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

•TITUSDICTION ANT) NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). Defendant was convicted of violatmg statutory provisions

regulating the sale of stocks and sales by unregistered agents. This appeal challenges the trial
court's order, committing defendant to the Utah State Prison for three consecutive
indeterminate terms of 0- to 3- years.
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Did the trial court act within its lawful discretion when it imposed, and stayed, three

consecutive 0- to 3- year prison sentences after the defendant's conviction of felony offenses
involving the offer or sale of securities?
This Court will not overturn a sentence unless the trial court has abused its discretion,

failed to consider legally relevant factors, or imposed a term that exceeds prescribed
limits. State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

All relevant provisions are attached to this brief in the addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural history
The State originally charged defendant with 14 counts regarding the unlawful offer or
sale of securities (R. 7-13). Two counts were later dismissed and an amended information was

filed (R. 559). On February 11, 1994, defendant entered into a plea bargain, in which he pled

guilty to three felony counts and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges (R. 46370). Defendant specifically pled guilty to counts 4, 5, and 9, which alleged that he had
violated Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989), Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (Supp. 1994). and Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1989) (R. 9,10,11). The defendant made his plea conditional on his

right to appeal the district court's jurisdiction (R. 461). On March 21, 1994, the trial court
imposed three consecutive 0- to 3-year prison terms but stayed execution and placed defendant
on probation (R. 475).
Statement offacts
Defendant's conviction resulted from his sale of securities in the "Mexican Peso'U.S.

Dollar Exchange Program" (R. 464). Although unregistered to sell securities in Utah,

Defendant offered to sell securities in this program to two individuals fid."). He was convicted
for this conduct as well as for omitting material facts regarding the securities which were

necessary in order not to mislead the potential buyers fid.).

Defendant did not give the potential buyers a prospectus, as required by Utah law, or
provide any of the information required in a prospectus, i.e., financial statements, a discussion
2

about the foreign exchange market for Mexican pesos, the amount of securities being offered,
details as to the application of proceeds from the sale, commissions paid or payable,

biographical details of principals and promoters, and sources of other funds for the business
(R. 19). The two individuals that defendant was convicted for defrauding invested a total of
$7000 in the scheme (R. 20).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Though it be true that Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1992)1 prohibits a
court from sentencing a person to prison in certain circumstances, those circumstances are not

present here. The State did not charge defendant with violating a rule or order; the
information clearly charged him with violating the statutory law. Section 61-1-21 does not

make ignorance of statutory law a defense. The maxim that people are presumed to know the
law still holds but the consequence of ignorantly violating an administrative rule or order is
softened. This softening provision is irrelevant, however, to the defendant, because the State
never accused him of violating mere administrative rules or orders, but of violating criminal
statutes.

In any event, the proper interpretation of the language at issue in section 61-1-21

requires the defendant to establish that he did not know of the rule or order. Yet. defendant
provided no evidence that he lacked knowledge of anything. Throughout the sentencing
hearing counsel for defendant merely asserts that the defendant lacked scienter. These
assertions were never supported. Thus, even assuming that "non-imprisonment" language in

1

Section 61-1-21 was amended in 1992, but the affect does not affect this case.
3

section 61-1-21 related to this case, defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that he did
not know about the rules or orders allegedly violated.
In the defendant's self-written supplemental brief, he argues that the district court, and

by implication this Court, lack both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to try him for a
crime. Defendant's challenges to the court's jurisdiction make little sense given the actual

nature of this case. Even assuming that he is not a citizen of the United States but is only a
citizen of the Texas "State/Republic" that assumption does not relieve defendant of his liability
for criminal actions he commits in Utah. The "United States" is not prosecuting the

defendant; the "State/Republic" of Utah is prosecuting defendant for actions he committed
within the territory of the state.
ARGUMENT

I.

BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT
CONVICTED FOR VIOLATING A RULE OR

ORDER, SECTION 61-1-21 DOES NOT LIMIT
THE COURT'S ABILITY TO SENTENCE
HIM TO PRISON.

From the time he was First charged with committing a criminal offense, defendant knew
that the State was alleging that he had violated the criminal law, not a rule or order. The
information gave the defendant specific and precise information about his conduct and the
manner in which that conduct violated state law (R. 7-14). The State charged defendant with

selling securities that were unregistered in Utah, omitting material facts in his representations

to potential buyers, and for being unregistered to act as a broker or seller in Utah (id.).
When a court convicts a person for violating any of these provisions, the penalty is set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1992). When defendant committed his
4

crimes, this statute provided for a fine of no more than $10,000, imprisonment for no more
than three years, or both. Section 63-1-21 also contained the following language: "No person

may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he proves that he had no knowledge
of the rule or order." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1992).

However, defendant was not convicted for violating a rule or order. Thus, the language

in section 61-1-21 that bars imprisonment in some cases does not limit the trial court's broad
discretion to impose a prison sentence in this case. That language only prohibits a prison
sentence when (1) the person was convicted for violating a rule or order; and (2) the person

proves he had no knowledge of the rule or order. In State v. Stephan. 671 P.2d 780 (Wash.
App. 1983), the defendant also challenged the court's power to impose a prison sentence on

the grounds that he did not know the rules or orders. Like defendant in this case, Stephan
was convicted for violating several provisions of Washington's laws regarding securities

registration and sales practices. Stephan. 671 P.2d at 782. The Washington court concluded
that the term "rule or order" did not refer to legislatively-enacted statutes, but only to the
securities division's administrative rules and orders. \& at 782-83. As the court pointed out,

this non-imprisonment language originated in the federal Securities and Exchange Act as a
limitation on the Securities and Exchange Commission's rule-making authority. EL; s_££

United States v. Lillev. 291 F.Supp. 989, 992 (D.C. Tex. 1968)(congressional debates showed

that provision written to prevent commission from "[adopting] or amending rules and
regulations without notice, thereby subjecting innocent persons to a harsh criminal penalty.").
As in Stephan. defendant here was not charged with violating a rule or order, but with

violating state statutes. Stephan. 671 P.2d at 783. Therefore, defendant's knowledge of
5

division rules or orders is irrelevant to the essential question that faced the trial court, i.e.,
having admitted to violating a state law, should defendant be sentenced to the statutorily

prescribed term of imprisonment? Section 61-1-21 does not excuse defendant from knowing,
and obeying, the laws. Lillev. 291 F.Supp. at 992 (Congress intended to charge even' man
with knowledge of the standards prescribed in the securities acts themselves).

Defendant's argument then that section 61-1-21 prevented the trial court from imposing a

prison sentence is wrong. The only limitation on the trial court's discretion is the general one
of fairness and justice. That obligation prevents a court from imposing a sentence that is
inherently unfair, clearly excessive, or one that no reasonable person could adopt. State v.
Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Russell 1 791 P.2d 188. 192-93 (Utah
1990); State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).

The trial court knew that defendant's case had both mitigating and aggravating factors
(R. 606-7). The court carried out its inherent duty of fairness and justice in the best way
possible: by imposing the maximum prison sentence while staying execution of the sentence in
order to allow the defendant to make restitution while on probation and to complete his appeal

of right (R. 609). The trial court's terms of probation included six months in jail, community
service, and recoupment of jail time (R. 610). The defendant has not served his jail time
because the court also stayed execution of that sentence pending this appeal.
In rendering his decision, the trial judge looked at the harm caused to the victims, their

vulnerability, and the defendant's willingness to take advantage of those vulnerabilities over a

period of time (id.). Even after looking at those factors though, the sentence is remarkably
light. Indeed, the only lighter sentencing option that the court could have imposed would have
6

been for a fine of $10,000 per offense. When looked at in this light, defendant's challenge
becomes little more than an unsupported claim that the Court has no right to sentence anyone

to prison for these offenses. Because the court stayed execution and placed the defendant on

probation, any prison term defendant may serve will actually result from his refusal to comply
with the terms of probation, namely, paying restitution to the victims: "If Mr. Boaz is not

going to honor the conditions of his probation, then as far as I am concerned the only fair
thing is for him to serve the maximum time in prison." (R. 609). The "stick" of potential
incarceration thus serves a useful and beneficial purpose to the ultimate goal of compensating
the victims.

In the alternative, even if a rule or order were an element in the defendant's conviction,

he never met his burden to prove that he "had no knowledge of the rule or order." Utah Code

Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1992). Section 61-1-21 only prohibits imprisonment for the
violation of any rule or order "if he [the defendant] proves that he had no knowledge of the
rule or order." Id. (emphasis added). By its very terms, this statute places on the defendant

the responsibility to prove his lack of knowledge. Lillev. 291 F.Supp. At 993 (even if "no
knowledge" clause applicable to defendant, he still did not prove that he had no knowledge).
Other than his unsupported legal arguments at the sentencing hearing that try to explain why
"willful" does not mean "willful," defendant also did not meet his burden at trial nor does he
meet it here.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD PERSONAL AND
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER

THE DEFENDANT; THEREFORE, THE COURT
CORRECTLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO
DISMISS.

FiBdiy. defend™., pro se jurisdict.ona, « , are unsupported The ^ ^
correct* record that lt had constitution, aulhorlty (0 ^^ alleged ^ ^
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^ ^^ ^ ^ ^
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Amm" rath£r ^ ^ "United S^" <**> »™-. The federal gove„ IS not
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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs, oral

argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS JllJday of March 1995.
JAN GRAHAM

Utah Attorney General

P^-HaJ^
'//
h

JAMES H. BEADLES

Assistant Attorney General
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RICHARD UDAY
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291 F.Supp, 989
(Ciieas:291 F.Supp. 989)

1

349BU94

UNITED STATES of America

Under section of Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
prohibiting imprisonment for violation of any rule
of Securities and Exchange Commission if violator
proves he had no knowledge of rule, a person cannot
properly be imprisoned for violation of standard in
rule of which he had no knowledge.
Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §

v.

Lester L. LILLEV.

UNITED STATES of America
v.

Malcolm G. BAKER, Jr.

Crim. Nos. 67-H-233, 68-H-228.

78ff(a).
United States District Court S.D. Texas, Houston

[4] LICENSES «=> 42(7)

Division.

238k42(7)

Defendants charged with violations of Securities
and Exchange Commission rule prohibiting use of
manipulative devices in sale of stock moved to have
imprisonment excluded from sentence which court
might impose. The District Court, Noel. J., held

Every man is charged with knowledge of standards
prescribed in Securities Acts themselves and person
whose conduct is expressly prohibited thereby is not
entitled to prove no knowledge of parallel rule
pursuant to statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of rule of Commission if violator proves
he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Exchange

that each defendant's admission that he knew his

Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ffia).

conduct was manipulative and that he knew
securities fraud was illegal precluded him from
discharging his burden of showing that he had no

349BU94

Oct. 2, 1968.

knowledge of violated rule, within statute
prohibiting imprisonment for violation of any rule if
violator proves he had no knowledge thereof.
Motions denied.

[4] SECURITIES REGULATION &=> 194

Every man is charged with knowledge of standards
prescribed in Securities Acts themselves and person
whose conduct is expressly prohibited thereby is not
entitled to prove no knowledge of parallel rule
pursuant to statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of rule of Commission if violator proves
he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).

[1] CRJMTNAL LAW @^ 273.3
110k273.3

By pleading guilty to indictment and information,
defendants admitted each and all acts charged.

[5] LICENSES <£= 42(7)
238k42(7)

[2] STATUTES <^=> 181(1)

Inasmuch as Securities Act prohibits securities fraud
in language almost identical with Commission's rule
prohibiting employment of manipulative and
deceptive devices in sale of stock and defendants
pleaded guilty to price manipulation, which is
expressly prohibited by Securities Exchange Act of
1934, even though they contended that they did not
happen to know that their conduct was in violation

361kl81(l)

First and most essential step in construction of any
statute is to ascertain intent of Congress in passing
it.

[31 LICENSES <S^= 42(7)
238k42(7)

Under section of Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
prohibiting imprisonment for violation of any rule
of Securities and Exchange Commission if violator
proves he had no knowledge of rule, a person cannot
properly be imprisoned for violation of standard in
rule of which he had no knowledge.

Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §

of rule,

defendants were not entitled to

78ff(a).

[51 SECURITIES REGULATION <S= 194
[3] SECURITIES REGULATION <$=> 194

avoid

imprisonment
under
statute
prohibiting
imprisonment for violation of any rule if violator
proves he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Act
of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(a) (2), 32(a), 15
U.S.C.A. §§78i(a)(2), 78ff(a).

349BU94

Copr. c West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works
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Inasmuch as Securities Act prohibits securities fraud

in language almost identical with Commission's rule
prohibiting employment of manipulative and
deceptive devices in sale of stock and defendants
pleaded guilty to price manipulation, which is
expressly prohibited by Securities Exchange Act of
1934, even though they contended that they did not
happen to know that their conduct was in violation
of rule, defendants were not entitled to avoid

imprisonment
under
statute
prohibiting
imprisonment for violation of any rule if violator
proves he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Act
of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(a) (2), 32(a), 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78i(a) (2), 78ff(a).

Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(a) (2). 32(a),
U.S.C.A. §§ 78i(a)(2), 78if(a).

2

15

[7] SECURITIES REGULATION <S=> 199
349Bkl99

Admission of each violator of rule of Securities and

Exchange Commission prohibiting employment of
manipulative devices in sale of stock that he knew
his conduct was manipulative and that he knew
securities fraud was illegal precluded each from
discharging his burden of showing that he had no
knowledge of rule within statute prohibiting
imprisonment for violation of rule if violator proves
he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Act of
1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(a) (2), 32(a). 15
U.S.C.A. §§78i(a)(2), 78ff(a).

[6] LICENSES c§=> 42(7)
238k42{7)

Within

statute

prohibiting

imprisonment

for

violation of rule of Securities and Exchange
Commission if violator had no knowledge thereof,
"no knowledge" means ignorance that conduct was

contrary to law. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).

[8] CRIMINAL LAW <S=> 273.3
110k273.3

By pleading guilty to charges of engaging in
manipulative devices in sale of stock, defendants
admitted that they knew securities fraud was
prohibited and no more knowledge was required for
conviction for violation of rule of Securities and

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.

[6] SECURITIES REGULATION <S=> 194
349Bkl94

Within

statute

prohibiting

imprisonment

for

violation of rule of Securities and Exchange
Commission if violator had no knowledge thereof,
"no knowledge" means ignorance that conduct was

Exchange Commission prohibiting use of such
devices and no more knowledge was required for
purposes of statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of any rule if violator proves he had no
knowledge of rule. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).
[8] LICENSES <&=> 42(7)
238k42(7)

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial

By pleading guilty to charges of engaging in
manipulative devices in sale of stock, defendants
admitted that they knew securities fraud was
prohibited and no more knowledge was required for

constructions and definitions.

conviction for violation of rule of Securities and

contrary to law. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).

[7] LICENSES <S=» 42(4)
238k42(4)
Admission of each violator of rule of Securities and

Exchange Commission prohibiting employment of
manipulative devices in sale of stock that he knew
his conduct was manipulative and that he knew
securities fraud was illegal precluded each from
discharging his burden of showing that he had no
knowledge of rule within statute prohibiting
imprisonment for violation of rule if violator proves
he had no knowledge thereof. Securities Act of
1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a); Securities

Exchange Commission prohibiting use of such
devices and no more knowledge was required for
purposes of statute prohibiting imprisonment for
violation of any rule if violator proves he had no
knowledge of rule. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).
[8] SECURITIES REGULATION <&=> 194
349Bkl94

By pleading guilty lo charges of engaging in
manipulative devices in sale of stock, defendants
admitted

that

they

knew

securities

fraud

was

prohibited and no more knowledge was required for

Copr. c West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works
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conviction for violation of rule of Securities and

Exchange Commission prohibiting use of such

3

did employ a manipulative and deceptive device and
contrivance * * * in that (he) did employ a device,

devices and no more knowledge was required for

scheme, and artifice to defraud, did make untrue

purposes of statute prohibiting imprisonment for

statements of material facts * * * and did engage in
acts, practices and a course of business which did
operate as *991 a fraud and deceit upon various
persons,
including
brokers,
dealers,
and
stockholders of Westec Corporation, all in the
following manner:

violation of any rule if violator proves he had no
knowledge of rule. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a).
•990 U.S. Atty., Morton Susman, and Asst. U.S.

Atty., Malcolm Dimmitt, for the United States.
"That from on or about May 1, 1966, until on or

Wayne

Fisher,

of

Fisher,

Roch,

Sales

&

Blackstock, Houston, Tex., for Lester L. Lillev.

Walter P. Zivley of Liddell, Dawson, Sapp &
Zivley, Houston, Tex., for Malcolm G. Baker, Jr.

about August 25, 1966. (he) and others acting in
concert with him purchased approximately 470,000
shares of the common capital stock of Westec

Corporation from various brokerage companies in

MEMORANDUM OPINION:

the State of Texas and elsewhere at prices ranging
from $45.00 to $60.00 per share, while at
substantially the same time, the defendant * * * and

NOEL, District Judge.

for the sale of a substantial number of said shares of

others acting in concert with him, sold and arranged
said Westec Corporation common capital stock.'
These are related cases arising out of the collapse
of Westec Corporation in August 1966.
Both
defendants are charged with violations of SEC Rule
10b-5, which provides as follows:

It was further alleged in the indictment to which
Lillev pled guilty, that the 'series of transactions in
Westec Corporation common capital stock described
hereinabove

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or

instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of a national securities
exchange,

(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to

would

and

did

create

a

false

and

misleading appearance of actual and apparent active
trading in such stock and did raise its price and did
cause and induce other persons to purchase such
stock, all of which was then and there well known to
the defendant, Lester L. Lilley. and such acts were
committed and caused to be committed by him for
such purposes.'

defraud,

(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading or

(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5, prescribed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b).

On August 27, 1968, defendant Malcolm G.
Baker, Jr., pled guilty to a onecount criminal
information likewise charging violation of SEC Rule
10b-5 in that 'on or about May 11. 1966 (Baker)
and others acting in concert with him purchased
approximately 13,000 shares of the common capital
stock of Westec Corporation * * * which said
purchases were intended to, and did, artificially
maintain the price of Westec stock and did support
the market price of said stock and prevent it from
declining and would and did create a false and
misleading appearance of actual and apparent active
trading in such stock * * * and said acts were
committed and caused to be committed by him for
such purposes.'

On December 9, 1967, defendant Lester L. Lilley

pled guilty to a one-count indictment charging that

[1] By pleading guilty to the indictment and

he 'directly and indirectly, wilfully and knowingly,

information, defendants admitted each and all of the
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acts charged in them, respectively. Subject to their
motions to which this memorandum opinion is

Representatives, which ultimaiely became the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The report of the

addressed, defendants are now before the Court for
sentencing.

conference committee announced but did not explain
the compromise[FN2] between the House and Senate
versions of Section

The penalty provision of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 is 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a), which provides:

32 of the Act.

From the

research conducted by counsel, and its own
independent research, the Court is persuaded that no
minutes

or

other

records

of

the

conference

Any person who willfully violates any provision
of this chapter, or any rule or regulation thereunder

committee's deliberations exist.

the violation of which is made unlawful or the

purpose of the clause, for they reveal the fears
generated by the spectre of a severe penalty ensuing

observance of which is required under the terms of
this chapter, * * * shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both, * * *; but no person shall[FNl]

be subject to imprisonment under this section for the
violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that
he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.

Pursuant to the 'no knowledge' clause or
exception of 78ff(a), each defendant has moved to
have imprisonment excluded from the sentence
which this Court may impose.
An evidentiary
hearing has been held, at which each defendant took
the witness stand. The only evidence of probative
force consisted of the testimony of defendants. Each
defendant testified that he had no knowledge of Rule
10b-5 at the time he committed the admitted acts.

In ruling on these motions the Court first must
construe the penalty statute to determine the
meaning and purpose of the 'no knowledge' clause
or exception and its applicability, if any, to the
charges and facts. If the clause is found applicable,

But earlier debates

in both House and Senate cast some light on the

from violation of a rule or regulation of the
proposed new administrative body, of which the
person charged had no knowledge.

The bill approved by the House had a more
stringent punishment provision than the compromise
contained in 78ff(a).
It did not distinguish
violations of rules from violations of the Act.

For

either kind of violation an offender might be fined
or imprisoned or both.[FN3]
Representative
Cooper, a member of the House Committe on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce which had
considered the bill, offered an

would

have

limited

criminal

violations of the Act itself.

defeated.
The House
Cooper's argument that
should not be granted the
rules and regulations the
criminal offense.'[FN4]

amendment that

punishment

to

The amendment was

rejected Representative
an administrative board
'unlimited power to draft
violation of which is a

The Senate version, by contrast, distinguished

it must then be determined as to each defendant

violations of a rule from a violation of the Act. The

whether he has discharged his burden of proof.

maximum penalty for the former was to be only a
$10,000 fme, while the maximum penalty for the
latter was to be a $25,000 fine and/or five years
imprisonment. Senator Steiwer considered even a
maximum of $10,000 too severe a penalty for a rule

The clause or exception is unusual in that it
permits a defendant to rebut the presumption that he
had knowledge of the rule or regulation under which
he is charged.
The provision has never been
construed, although it has been held constitutional
*992 in the face of vagueness attack.[FN1]

[2j The first step, indeed the most essential step,
in the construction of any statute is to ascertain the
intent of the Congress in passing it. Unfortunately,
in the case of this 'no knowledge' clause, the
evidence of such intent is somewhat obscure.

clause

was

added

in

the

conference

The

committee

formed to compromise the differences in the bills
passed by the Senate and the House of

violation, and offered an amendment that would

have limited the fine to $500 unless the prosecution
proved an intent to defraud. His remarks suggest a
fear that the Commission might adopt or amend
rules and regulations without notice, thereby
subjecting innocent persons to a harsh criminal
penalty.[FN5] The Senate rejected this amendment
because violations of rules had already been
sufficiently distinguished from violations of the
Act.[FN6]
[3][4][5]

It

seems
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compromise was adopted to ensure that no person
could be imprisoned for the violation of a standard

10b-5.

contained in a rule of which he had no knowledge.
It is equally clear, however, that Congress intended

[7] In pleading guilty to the charges heretofore
quoted, each of these defendants admitted that he

to charge every man with knowledge of the
standards prescribed in the securities acts

also

themselves.

It

would

frustrate

the

intent

of

Congress to permit a person whose conduct is
expressly prohibited by statute to attempt to prove
no knowledge of a parallel rule provision. Allowing
these defendants to invoke the 'no knowledge'
clause would have precisely this effect. The conduct
here admitted by defendants is prohibited by two
provisions of the securities acts. Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a).
prohibits securities fraud in language almost
identical *993 with the language of Rule 10b-5.
[FN7] Moreover, the fraudulent activity to which
defendants have pled guilty, price manipulation, is
expressly prohibited by 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. 78i(a)(2). [FN81 It was not intended by the
Congress thai the 'no knowledge' clause of the
penalty statute (78ff(a)) should be available to
persons who were charged with knowing their
conduct to be in violation of law, but did not happen
to know that it was in violation of a particular rule
or regulation of the SEC such as Rule 10b-5.
[6] Alternatively, if the 'no knowledge' clause is

applicable under the facts of their situation. I find

knew securities fraud was a violation of law.
testified

that

he

did

not

consider

Each
his

manipulative conduct as fraudulent, but Rule 10b-5
does not
expressly prohibit the
fraudulent
manipulation of securities prices. It prohibits fraud,
and leaves to the courts the task of defining the
specific kinds of securities fraud.
A lack of
knowledge that manipulative activity is fraudulent is
thus

irrelevant.

What

is

relevant

is

that

each

defendant has admitted that he knew his conduct was

manipulative and that he knew securities fraud was
illegal.
These admissions by each defendant
preclude him from discharging his burden of
showing 'no knowledge' of Rule 10b-5. To the
contrary, they affirmatively demonstrate that
defendants were familiar with the import of the rule.
The 'no knowledge' requirement of 78ff(a) is not
met by proof that defendants did not know that their
specific conduct was within the prohibition of the
rule.

•994 [81 By pleadmg guilty to the charges
heretofore quoted, defendants admitted that they
knew securities fraud was prohibited, which is the
substance of Rule 10b-5. No more knowledge is
required.

that defendants have failed to satisfy their burden of

showing no knowledge of Rule 10b-5. Proof of no
knowledge cannot mean proof that defendants did
not know, for example, the precise number or
common name of the rule, the book and page where
it was to be found, or the date upon which it was

promulgated. It does not even mean proof of a lack
of knowledge that their conduct was proscribed by
rule rather than by statute. Proof of 'no knowledge'
of the rule can only mean proof of an ignorance of
the substance of the rule, proof that they did not

For the foregoing reasons, which to the extent
they may be in conflict therewith, supersede those
given orally from the bench, I find that neither
defendant is entitled to the benefit of the limitation

of punishment clause of 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a).
Accordingly, each of the motions before the Court is
denied.

FN1. United States v. Guterma, 189 F.Supp. 265
(S. D.N. Y. 1960).

know that their conduct was contrary to law.
FN2. Report of the Joint Conference Committee, 78

Here, neither defendant has discharged his
burden, whether the standard for measuring same be

Cong.Rec. 10263 (1934).

that of 'beyond a reasonable doubt' or, 'by a
preponderance of the evidence.' The rule does not
attempt to itemize specific kinds of fraud,
Therefore, proof that a defendant knew securities
fraud to be prohibited by law should prevent him
from discharging his burden under the 'no
knowledge' clause of proving ignorance of Rule

FN3. Ibid.

FN4. 78 Cong.Rec. 8112, 8113 (1934;.
FN5. 78 Cong.Rec. 8273-8298 (1934).
FN6. 78 Cong.Rec. 8281-8298 (1934).
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FN7. (a) It shall he unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means
or
iiurumems of transportation
or
communication in interstate commerce or by the use

of the mails, directly or indirectly—(1) to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to
obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to slate
a material fact necessary to order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (3)

to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon the purchaser.
FN8. (a) Ii shall he unlawful for any person.

directly or indirectly, by the use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
or for any member of a national securities
exchange-(2) To effect, alone or with one or more
other persons, a series of transactions in any
security registered on a national securities exchange

creating actual or apparent active trading in such
security or raising or depressing the price of such
security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase
or sale of such security by others,
END OF DOCUMENT
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(Cite as: 35 Wash.App. 889, 671 P.2d 780)
STATE of Washington, Respondent,

110k273.1(5)

Personal Restraint of:

When a defendant's written statement on a plea of
guilty in compliance with rule provides prima facie
verification of the voluntariness of the plea and the
judge goes on to inquire orally of the defendant and

Phillip Michael STEPHAN, Petitioner.

satisfies himself on the record of the existence of the

Nos. 5299-m-l, 5719-III-4.

various criteria of voluntariness, the presumption of
voluntariness is well nigh irrefutable. CrR 4.2(g).

v.

Phillip Michael STEPHAN, Appellant.
In the Matter of the Application for Relief From

Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 3.

Oct. 18, 1983.

Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court,
Spokane County, Olson, J., of fraud in connection
with the offer and sale of a security. Defendant
appealed and filed personal restraint petition. The
Court of Appeals. Munson, C.J., held tha!: (1) trial

[4] CRIMINAL LAW <g=» 273.1(1)
110k273.1(l)

Whether a plea is entered knowingly is decided by
looking at all the circumstances.
[5] CRIMINAL LAW <&=> 273.1(4)
110k273.1(4)
Defendant entered guilty plea to

violation

of

court properly sentenced defendant to a term of
imprisonment; (2) defendant was aware, prior to
pleading guilty, that the possible consequences of

provision of Securities Act with full knowledge that
incarceration was possible, notwithstanding his
attorney's misinterpretation of the applicable statute,
where defendant made a written statement on plea of
guilty in compliance with rule and the trial court

his crime could include incarceration; (3) defendant
was not denied effective assistance of trial counsel;

contained at least six references to incarceration.

and (4) trial court properly ordered restitution.

West's RCWA 21.20.010, 21.20.400; CrR 4.2(g).

Conviction affirmed;

personal restraint petition

orally affirmed defendant's plea, and the record

[6] CRIMINAL LAW <$=> 1134(2)

demed.

HOkl 134(2)
Review of claim of defendant, convicted of violation

[1] SECURITIES REGULATION ®= 323

of provisions of the Securities Act, that he was

349Bk323

denied effective assistance of counsel, was upon the

Provision of Securities Act that "no person may be
imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if
that person proves that he or she had no knowledge
of the rule or order" did not preclude the trial court
from sentencing a defendant, convicted of fraud in
connection with the offer and sale of a security, to a
term of imprisonment, as defendant violated a
statutory "provision," not a "rule or order." West's

entire record, and the issue was whether defendant

RCWA 21,20.010, 21.20.400.

[2] CRIMINAL LAW <£=> 273.1(5)

Defendant, convicted pursuant to guilty plea of
violating provision of the Securities Act, was not
denied effective assistance of counsel on ground that

received effective representation and a fair and
impartial hearing.
West's RCWA 21.20.010,
21,20.400.

[7] CRIMINAL LAW' <£= 641.13(2.1)
110k641.13(2.1)
Formerly 110k641.13(2)

110k273.1(5)

his

When a defendant fills out a written statement on

defendant could be incarcerated for the offense with

plea of guilty in compliance with rule and
acknowledges that he or she has read it and

which he was charged, in that, although trial counsel
argued an erroneous reading of the applicable
statute, defendant was made aware that the possible
consequences of his
crime could
include

understands it and that its contents are true, the

written statement provides prima facie verification
of the voluntariness of the plea. CrR 4.2(g).

trial

counsel

incarceration.

misled

West's

21.20.400.

[3] CRIMINAL LAW <£=> 273.1(5)
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[13] CRIMINAL LAW <®=^ 1208.4(2)

[8] CRTMLNAL LAW <^ 273.4(1)
110k273.4(l)

110kl208.4(2)

When the trial court indicates clearly the penalty for

A trial court may order restitution unless prohibited
by statute. West's RCWA 9A.20.030.

a crime, any claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel related to the penalty is waived.

[14] SECURITIES REGULATION <S^ 329
[9] CRIMINAL LAW <£=• 1030(1)

349Bk329

110kl030(l)
Failure to raise an issue before the trial court

In prosecution in which
one count of securities
whom the prosecutor
$1,600,000, trial court

generally precludes the party from raising it on
appeal.

defendant pleaded guilty to
fraud involving 148 people
stated were defrauded of
properly ordered restitution

of 550,000. West's RCWA 9A.20.030, 21.20.010,

[10] STATUTES •£= 181(1)

21.20.400.

361kl81(l)

The rules of statutory construction require that the
Court of Appeals ascertain legislative intent, seek
the spirit of statutory provisions, and avoid a
construction which voids any section or words.

•890 **781 John H. Browne, Browne, Ressler &

Foster, Seattle, for appellant and petitioner,
Fred J. Caruso, Deputy
Spokane, for respondent.

Prosecuting

Atty.,

[10] STATUTES <S=> 183

MUNSON, Chief Judge.

361kl83

The rules of statutory construction require that the
Court of Appeals ascertain legislative intent, seek
the spirit of statutory provisions, and avoid a
construction which voids any section or words.
[10] STATUTES <£=• 206
361k206

The rules of statutory construction require that the
Court of Appeals ascertain legislative intent, seek
the spirit of statutory provisions, and avoid a
construction which voids any section or words.
[11] CRIMINAL LAW «=> 27
110k27

Language, "in any prosecution under this title," in
statute governing prosecutions related to felonies
defined outside the criminal code, refers to statutes
which, inter alia, define terms, limit actions,

establish culpability and capacity, set the standard of
proof, and establish defenses.
West's RCWA
9A.04.010 et seq., 9A.16.010 et seq., 9A.20.020,

By direct appeal and personal restraint petition,
Phillip Michael Stephan challenges his sentence for
violating the Securities Act of Washington under
RCW 21.20.010. [FN1]
He contends RCW
21.20.400 [FN2j does not authorize either
imprisonment or restitution in his case. We affirm
the sentence and deny the personal restraint petition.
FN1. RCW 21.20.010 provides: "It is unlawful for
any person, in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly: "(1)
To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud; "(2) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact

or to omit to

state a

material

fact

necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading; or "(3) To engage in any

act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person."

9A.20.030, 9A.20.040.

[12] CRIMINAL LAW ®=* 27
110k27

A felony defined outside the criminal code becomes
a classified crime through application of statutes
governing prosecutions related to felonies defined
outside the criminal code and punishment for felony
convictions.
9A.20.040.

West's

RCWA

9A.20.020,

FN2. RCW 21.20.400 provides: "Any person who
wilfully violates any provision of this chapter except
RCW 21.20.350, or who wilfully violates any rule
or order under this chapter, or who wilfully violates
RCW 21.20.350 knowing the statement made to be
false or misleading in any material respect, shall
upon conviction be

fined

not

more

than

five

thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; but no person may be imprisoned
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for the violation of am rule or order if that person
proves that he or she had no knowledge of the rule
or order.

No indictment or information may be

renirned under this chapter more than five years
after the alleged violation."

essentially argued "provision" and "rule or order"
mean the same thing.
The court rejected this
analysis as it had several days previously when a
codefendant raised the same issue. Mr. Stephan was
aware of this decision.

He was sentenced to *892

the maximum term of 10 years and to pay $50,000
Mr. Stephan and two codefendants were charged
with 24

counts relating to

securities and theft.

fraudulent

sale

of

When the court denied Mr.

Stephan's motion to sever his trial from his
codefendants, Mr. Stephan pleaded guilty to *891
one count of fraud in connection with the offer and

sale of the security, a violation of RCW 21.20.010.
The amended information indicated Mr. Stephan
offered a fraudulent security to 148 people. **782
In his written plea statement, CrR 4.2(g), Mr.

Stephan indicated he understood the maximum
penalty for the violation was not more than 10 years
in prison and/or a $5,000 fine. The statement also

in restitution over the 10-year period. During the
hearing, Mr. Stephan did not challenge that court's
authority to impose restitution.

This appeal (No. 5299-HI-l) and personal
restraint petition (No. 5719-III-4) followed. The
appeal challenges both the authority to incarcerate
Mr. Stephan and the authority to impose restitution.
The personal restraint petition argues: Mr. Stephan
did not knowingly enter his plea because he did not
know incarceration could occur and his trial counsel

was ineffective for misleading him on the issue.

indicated Mr. Stephan understood the prosecutor

Mr. Stephan's reading of RCW 21.20.400 is

was going to recommend "the penal institution and

incorrect. The term "rule or order" is consistently
used throughout RCW Title 21 to refer to actions of
the Director of Licensing of this state. See, e.g.,
RCW 21.20.110(2), .250, . 280, .310(1), .320(1),
.325, .370, and .390. RCW 21.20.390 begins:
Whenever it appears to the director that any

restitution."

The statement indicated he understood

the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles set the

minimum prison term. On the final page of the
statement, Mr, Stephan indicated he did not know
the securities laws
violating them.

until he

was

charged with

In the subsequent hearing on the plea, the court
orally advised Mr. Stephan the nature of the charge
and that he could receive a maximum penalty of 10
years in prison. Mr. Stephan indicated he
understood.

The court orally advised him the

prosecutor was recommending incarceration; Mr,
Stephan indicated he understood this to be his
agreement with the prosecutor in exchange for
dropping the 23 remaining charges. When Mr.
Stephan attempted to present his limited involvement
in the activities, the court asked if he was qualifying

his statement. Mr. Stephan admitted again his
involvement and asserted he was guilty as charged;
neither he nor his attorney contended the court could
not incarcerate him or order restitution.

The sentencing hearing was held on July 14,
1982. At the hearing, Mr. Stephan outlmed his
limited involvement. His attorney sought leniency
and, for the first time, challenged the court's
authority under RCW 21.20.400 to incarcerate Mr.
Stephan. His attorney argued the statute would not

permit incarceration here because Mr. Stephan did
not know he violated a "rule or order".

Counsel

person has engaged or is about to engage in any
act or practice constituting a violation of any
provision of this chapter or any rule or order
hereunder,

the

director

may

in

his

or

her

discretion:

(1) Issue an order ...

This is but one example showing the meaning of the
word "order". While the word "rule" also appears
throughout RCW Title 21 in reference to the
authority of the director, his or her authority to
make rules is established in RCW' 21.20.450:

The administration of the provisions of this
chapter shall be under the department of licensing.
The director may from time to time make, amend,
and rescind such rules and forms as are necessary

to carry out the provisions of this chapter,
including rules defining any term, whether or not
such term is used in the Washington securities
law.
The director may classify securities,
persons, and matters within the director's
jurisdiction, and prescribe different requirements
for different classes. No rule or form, may be
made unless the director finds that the action is

necessary or appropriate in the public interest
•893 or for the protection of investors and
consistent with the purposes fairly intended by the
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policy and provisions of this chapter.
In
prescribing rules and forms the director may
**783 cooperate with the securities administrators
of the other states and the securities and exchange
commission with a view to effectuating the policy
of this statute to achieve maximum uniformity in
the form and content of registration statements,
applications, and reports wherever practicable.
All

rules and

forms

of the director

shall

be

published.
'[Rjule or order" thus clearly is meant to mean
something entirely different from "provision", used
in context with the phrase "of this chapter".

[1] The language of RCW 21.20.400 parallels the
language of section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.

The scienter

requirement has been interpreted as a congressional
limitation on the rule-making authority of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. See Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 97 S.Ct. 1292,
51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47
L.Ed.2d 668 (1976). See also A, Bromberg & L.
Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud

§ 2.1(240) (1982). The exception therefore has no
significance because Mr. Stephan pleaded guilty to a
violation

of

RCW

21.20.010,

a

statutory

"provision," not a "rule or order". The court did
not therefore err in sentencing Mr. Stephan to serve
10 years in prison.
|2][3][4][5J As to whether Mr. Stephan knowingly
entered the plea bargain, State v. Perez, 33
Wash.App. 258, 261-62, 654 P.2d 708 (1982),
applies:
When a defendant fills out a written statement on

plea of guilty in compliance with CrR 4.2(g) and
acknowledges that he or she has read it and
understands it and that its contents are true, the

written statement provides prima facie verification
of the plea's voluntariness.
In re Keene, 95
Wash.2d 203, 206-07, 622 P.2d 360 (1980);

In

re Teems, [28 Wash.App. 631, 626 P.2d 13
(1981) ]; State v. Ridgley, 28 Wash.App. 351,
623 P.2d 717 (1981). When the judge goes on to
inquire orally of the defendant and satisfies *894
himself on the record of the existence of the

various criteria of voluntariness, the presumption
of voluntariness is well nigh irrefutable.
Whether a plea is entered knowingly is decided by
looking at all the circumstances. Wood v. Morris,

87 Wash.2d 501, 506, 554 P.2d 1032 (1976). See
also, State v. Chervenell, 99 Wash,2d 309, 314,
662 P.2d 836 (1983).
Neither Wood nor In re
Keene, 95 Wash.2d 203, 622 P.2d 360 (1980),

require a reversal where the court fails explicitly to
ascertain the defendant's knowledge of the
consequences; instead, the record is searched for
factors which indicate such knowledge. Between the
written plea statement and the court's oral
affirmation of the plea, this record contains at least
six

references

to

incarceration.

We

hold

Mr.

Stephan entered his plea with full knowledge
incarceration was possible, notwithstanding his
attorney's misinterpretation of the statute.
[6] The next issue is whether the record supports
Mr. Stephan's assertion of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Review is again upon the entire record; the
issue is whether Mr. Stephan received effective
representation and a fair and impartial hearing.
State v. Ermert, 94 Wash.2d 839, 849, 621 P.2d
121 (1980).

[7][8] This record supports three conclusions: (1)
Mr. Stephan signed an agreement which the State
contends he and his counsel prepared.
The
statement contained the appropriate maximum
penalty and the prosecutor's recommendation.
Further, a codefendant charged with the same
violation was sentenced to prison a few days earlier.
Mr. Stephan and his attorney were thus aware of the
possible consequences of his plea, (2) The attorney
argued in good faith that incarceration was not
proper. An appeal has been pursued by new counsel
raising the same issue. Therefore, it is difficult to
say the attorney's alleged advice was "a serious
dereliction of duty". State v. Butler, 17 Wash.App.
666, 678, 564 P.2d 828 (1977).

Nor was it

"outside the range of competence required of
attorneys representing criminal defendants." State
v. Perez, supra at 264, 654 P.2d 708.

(3) Mr.

Stephan *895 was specifically informed by the
**784 court the maximum penalty was 10 years
imprisonment; "a defendant has some duty to
request a clarification" in such a situation. State v.

Butler, supra at 674, 564 P.2d 828. We hold Mr.
Stephan received effective assistance of counsel.

Although counsel argued an erroneous reading of
RCW 21.20.400, Mr. Stephan was made aware the
possible consequences of his crime could include
incarceration. When the trial court indicates clearly
the penalty for a crime, any claim of ineffective
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assistance related to the penalty is waived. See In re
Teems, supra at 637, 626 P.2d 13.

may order the defendant to pa\ an amount, fixed bv
the coun, not to exceed double the amount of the

defendant's

Mr. Stephan next argues an order of restitution is
not permitted under RCW 21.20.400 because the
statute speaks only of imprisonment for 10 years
and'or a fine of $5,000. He further argues reference
to RCW 9A.20.020 [FN3] and RCW 9A.20.030
[FN4] is not correct because the Securities Act of

•896 Washington is not mentioned in RCW Title
9A.

FN3. Laws of 1981, ch.
former RCW 9A.20.020)
"(1) Felony, No person
felony shall be punished
exceeding the following:
felony, by confinement

137, § 37, p. 534 (the
stated in pertinent pan:
convicted of a classified
by confinement or fine
"... "(b) For a class B
in a state correctional

gain or victim's loss from die
commission of a crime." (Effective July 10, 1982).

The State contends violation of RCW 21.20.400

becomes a class B felony because of the following
language of RCW 9A.20.040:
Prosecutions related to felonies

defined outside

Title 9A RCW. In any prosecution under this title
where the grade or degree of a crime is
determined by reference to the degree of a felony
for which the defendant or another previously had
been sought, arrested, charged, convicted, or
sentenced, if such felony is defined by a statute of
this state which is not in Title 9A RCW, unless

otherwise provided:

institution for a term of ten years, or b\ a fine in an
amount fixed by

the court of twenty thousand
dollars, or by both such confinement and fine; ..."
RCW 9A.20.020 now states in pertinent pan' "(1)
Felon>. Every person convicted of a classified
felony shall be punished as follows: "... "(b) For a
class B felonv. by imprisonment in a state

(2) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment
authorized by law upon conviction of such felony
is eight years or more, but less than twenty years,
such felony shall be treated as a class B felony for
purposes of this title;

correctional institution for a maximum term of not

more than ten years, or by a fine in an amount
fixed by the coun of not more man twenty thousand
dollars, or b\ both such imprisonment and fine;

[9] First, Mr. Stephan did no! raise this argument
prior to this appeal, even though he was well aware

..." (Effective April 1. 1982.)

to raise an issue before the trial coun generally
precludes the party from raising it on appeal. Smith

FN4. Laws of 1979, ch. 29, § 3, p. 174 (the former
RCW 9A.20.030) stated in peninent part: "(1) If a
person has gained money or property or caused a
victim to lose money or property through the
commission of a crime, upon conviction thereof the
coun, in lieu of imposing die fine authorized for the
offense under RCW 9A.20.020. may order the
defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not
to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain

v. Shannon, 100 Wash.2d 26, 37, 666 P.2d 351

or victim's loss from the commission of a crime."

RCW 9A.20.030 now states in pertinent pan: "(1) If
a person has gained money or property or caused a
victim to lose money or property through the
commission of a crime, upon conviction thereof or
when the offender pleads guilty to a lesser offense
or fewer offenses and agrees with the prosecutor's
recommendation that die offender be required to

pay restitution to a victim of an offense or offenses
which are not prosecuted pursuant to a plea
agreement, the court, in lieu of imposing the fine
authorized for the offense under RCW 9A.20.020,

of the State's intention to seek restitution.

(1983). [FN5]

Failure

Because of the precedential value

involved, we address the issue.

See Sorenson v.

Bellingham, 80 Wash.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512
(1972).
FN5. One problem created when an issue is not
presented at the trial level is readily apparent here.
Mr. Stephan has not addressed the effect of RCW
9A.20.040 on RCW 21.20.400 in his appeal. This
court is therefore without guidance on his view of
the statute.

•*785 [10][11] RCW 9A.20.040 is not a model of

clarity. Reference to "any prosecution under this
title" in the early part of the statute creates the
confusing idea that the prosecution must *897 be for
a classified crime already a part of RCW Title 9A.
The rules of statutory construction require that we
ascertain legislative intent, Millers Casualty Ins. Co.
v. Briggs, 100 Wash.2d 1, 5, 665 P.2d 891 (1983),
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seek the spirit of the provision. State v. The (1972)
Dan J. Evans Campaign Comm., 86 Wash.2d 503,
508, 546 P.2d 75 (1976), and avoid a construction

which voids any section or words, Nisqually Delta
Ass'n v. DuPont, 95 Wash.2d 563, 568, 627 P.2d

956 (1981). Applying these rules, we hold the
language quoted above refers to RCW 9A.04
through 9A.16, which defines terms, limits actions,
establishes culpability and capacity, sets the standard
of proof, establishes defenses, etc. RCW Title 9A
is the comprehensive criminal code of Washington;
all prosecutions are "under this title".
[12][13] The State's interpretation of RCW
9A.20.040 is correct.
A felony defined outside
RCW Title 9A becomes a classified crime through

application of RCW 9A.20.040 and .020. A trial
court may order restitution unless prohibited by the
statute,

RCW 9A.20.030.

[14] Mr. Stephan pleaded guilty to one count of
securities fraud involving 148 people.
The
prosecutor stated these people were defrauded of
$1,600,000

corporation's

to

fund,

in

nonexistent

some

manner,

leasing

the

scheme.

Restitution of $50,000 is therefore well within the
evidence.

The conviction is affirmed and
restraint petition is denied.

the

personal

EDGERTON, J. pro tern., and McINTURFF, J.,
concur.

END OF DOCUMENT
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